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 Abstract 
 
Declining citizen engagement is a concern across government. Furthermore, 
there are significant discrepancies between rates of engagement across 
different sectors of society. This report uses the insights of behavioural 
economics to examine citizens’ motivations for civic and civil engagement. We 
conducted focus groups with citizens who, evidence suggests, are less likely 
to engage than the average, but who ‘bucked the trend’, in order to analyse 
what drove them to do so. Whilst typical policy responses aim to manipulate 
the ‘external factors’ of cost, effort and information, we found evidence that 
suggested it was time, not money, that constituted the main ‘cost’ to getting 
involved.  
 
We also examined the internal drivers of engagement, noting the significance 
of habit, loss aversion and the tendency to honour public commitments in 
driving engagement. Lastly, we found that the triggers of engagement were 
often located in social networks – both institutionalised and informal – and 
policymakers must connect with citizens through these networks if they are to 
raise levels of engagement.  
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Main messages 
• This report responds to concerns about the perceived decline in citizen 
engagement. It uses a behavioural economic framework to offer solutions 
to this decline. A lack of citizen engagement should be of concern to 
policymakers for a variety of reasons. First, high levels of engagement are 
needed to ensure democratic legitimacy. Second, modern public services 
increasingly rely on citizen involvement if they are to work effectively. 
Third, citizens’ involvement in the provision of public goods can enhance 
individual and communal well-being and strengthen social ties.  
 
• There are significant discrepancies between rates of participation across 
different sectors of society. Certain groups record levels of engagement 
which are noticeably lower than average. These trends are particularly 
pronounced among young people, aged between 18 and 25, and those 
from some black or minority ethnic backgrounds. We conducted focus 
groups with citizens from these groups who, evidence suggests, are less 
likely to engage than the average, but who ‘buck the trend’.  
 
• The traditional, market-based tools of policymaking are closely bound up 
with ‘rational choice theory’. Typically, this led to policy responses that 
manipulate the ‘external factors’ of cost, effort and information. In focus 
groups, when presented with this conclusion, the response was 
overwhelmingly dismissive. No participants raised the issue of the ‘costs’ 
of engagement unprompted. When it comes to the external factors to 
boost engagement, focus group members argued that it was time not 
money that constituted the main ‘cost’ to getting involved. It was also 
found that the initial decision to engage involved recognition of the 
personal benefits, notably the provision of CV-building opportunities. 
 
• We also examined the internal drivers of engagement, these include: the 
force of habit; the role of loss aversion; and the tendency to honour stated 
commitments. Whilst these factors were significant in driving engagement, 
we found that it also takes an initial ‘push’ from someone else. Above all, 
we found that evidence from the focus groups and literature showed that 
the triggers of participation were centred on social networks – both 
institutionalised and informal. Policymakers must respond to the different 
ways in which different groups get involved and to the changing nature of 
social networks in the modern world.  
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Executive summary 
 
Policymakers have recently expressed concerns about a perceived fall in 
levels of citizen engagement. The trends associated with this decline are not 
confined to the UK, and have been evident in many industrialised countries. 
They include a dramatic fall in the membership of political parties, a drop in 
electoral turnout and surveys which indicate a consistent lack of trust in 
politicians and traditional political institutions.  
 
Citizen engagement matters for a variety of reasons. First, high levels of 
engagement are (arguably) needed to ensure democratic legitimacy. Second, 
modern public services increasingly rely on citizen involvement if they are to 
work effectively. Third, citizens’ involvement in the provision of public goods 
can enhance individual and communal well-being and strengthen social ties.  
 
There are significant discrepancies between rates of participation across 
different sectors of society. Certain groups record levels of engagement which 
are noticeably lower than average. These trends are most pronounced among 
young people, aged between 18 and 25, and those from black or minority 
ethnic backgrounds.  
 
This report uses the insights of behavioural economic literature to examine 
citizens’ motivations for civic and civil engagement. We conducted focus 
groups with citizens who, evidence suggests, are less likely to engage that the 
average, but who ‘buck the trend’. In doing so, we hoped to identify those 
motivational factors that led to engagement, and which might have wider 
pertinence for policymakers.  
 
Two focus groups were carried out. The first comprised eight 16-25 years olds 
who regularly took part in activities related to civic activism, civic participation 
or civic consultation. The second consisted of eight individuals from black or 
minority ethnic backgrounds who were involved in civic participation or civic 
consultation activities.   
 
The traditional, market-based, tools of policymaking are closely bound up with 
a model of human behaviour known as rational choice theory, which forms the 
mainstay of classical economic theories on how we reach our decisions. 
Typically, this led to policy responses that used financial incentives or 
disincentives (subsidies, taxes, tax relief), offered additional information to 
highlight the rationality of certain choices, or resorted to simple coercion by 
6 
 
Foley and Griffiths | Engaging Behaviour | Social Market Foundation | Page 7 
 
way of regulation. These tools all manipulate the ‘external factors’ of cost, 
effort and information. 
 
Rational choice theory adopts two key assumptions: the first is that an 
individual is ultimately self-interested, and will seek to maximise their own 
utility wherever possible; the second is that individuals are rational; for a given 
decision, they will weigh up the costs and benefits they stand to incur and opt 
for actions which maximise the benefits they accrue while minimising costs. If 
we apply these premises to concrete examples of collective action – voting, 
say, or taking part in a political protest – the logical outcome in almost every 
case appears to be inaction (e.g. the effort of voting greatly outweighs the slim 
likelihood of one’s vote making a difference).  
 
In focus groups, when presented with the view that financial costs made a 
difference to engagement the response was overwhelmingly dismissive. No 
participants raised the issue of the financial costs of engagement unprompted. 
However, when asked by the group administrator to discuss their perceptions 
of the costs they incurred through participation, the key aspect raised was 
time not money. 
 
We argue in this report that although behavioural economics is currently in 
vogue, there are limits to its application. First, there are concerns about 
freedom and individual choices, which make applications of this approach 
more applicable in some areas than others. Second, behavioural economics 
has little to say about the structural challenges that citizens often face and 
which limit their ability to act in certain ways. However, these concerns aside, 
behavioural economics can provide a more accurate and holistic overview of 
the factors affecting engagement behaviour, particularly those generally 
neglected by rational choice theory.  
 
In addition to the external (generally, rational choice) drivers of behaviour, we 
considered the internal and social drivers. On the internal drivers, a common 
theme of the literature was that, when attempting to engage the public in 
negotiation on specific and technical policy matters, there also needs to be 
recognition that ‘heuristics’ (that is a variety of biases and cognitive shortcuts) 
are likely to play a prominent role in their choices. Perhaps the most powerful 
heuristic is the force of habit. Other important internal drivers were the role of 
loss aversion (a desire to ensure that a situation did not deteriorate further) 
and the tendency to honour stated commitments. In the focus groups there 
was also a clear desire from participants to honour commitments once they 
had made them, particularly when given to friends or family members.  
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The social drivers of change were also significant. Our focus groups revealed 
that the initial spurs to engage were almost always linked to people’s 
involvement in particular social networks. In some cases, the decision to 
engage was taken in response to a particular event affecting an individual’s 
local or cultural community, in others it was due to a personal request.  
 
We conclude with several recommendations for policymakers. When it comes 
to the external factors to boost engagement, as noted above, a lack of time 
was the crucial factor. The focus of policy to encourage involvement, 
therefore, must be on compensating for the time involved. This could be by 
working with employers to allow more volunteering opportunities in work time. 
It was also found that the initial decision to engage involved recognition of the 
personal benefits, notably the provision of CV-building opportunities. Once 
there was an initial decision to engage, this often ‘snowballed’ into other areas 
and greater commitment.  
 
Internal factors to boosting engagement include the well-known approach of 
getting stated commitment on when, where and for whom to engage. This 
activates citizens’ often latent desire to get involved. However, we found that 
this desire can take an initial ‘push’ from someone else. A consequence is that 
government should actively work with community groups, and other 
organisations that provide engagement opportunities, to fund active 
community ‘recruitment strategies’. The evidence also showed that citizens 
also respond to people like them (or people who share certain backgrounds). 
There is a large amount of work on ‘imitation’ and the greater use of role 
models to encourage involvement could be explored further. This could be a 
particularly powerful way of getting young people more involved.  
 
In terms of social factors, evidence from the focus groups and literature 
showed that the triggers of participation were centred on social networks – 
both institutionalised and informal. Even where the decision to participate was 
in response to a chance event, action was generally coordinated through a 
pre-existing social group. Yet, policymakers must respond to the different 
ways in which different groups get involved and to respond to social networks 
as they are, not as they were. This means providing information and links on 
social networking sites to encourage engagement, as well as providing 
information via traditional institutions, such as trade unions, schools and 
religious organisations.  
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Chapter 1: The problem of disengagement1  
Main messages 
This chapter examines the extent of the fall in citizen engagement. It provides 
details of the decline and some of the main theoretical explanations for it. It 
also provides an account of why this decline matters. An important challenge 
for policymakers is to ensure that levels of citizen engagement reflect the 
diversity of society; another is to ensure that those citizens who do have a 
desire to get involved are able to do so. We conclude the section with a brief 
discussion of levels of engagement between different groups.  
 
Perceptions of a decline in citizen engagement are a concern across 
government. The trends associated with this decline are not confined to the 
UK, and have been evident in many industrialised countries. They include a 
dramatic fall in the membership of political parties, a drop in electoral turnout 
and surveys which indicate a consistent lack of trust in politicians and 
traditional political institutions. These trends have dramatically altered the 
political landscape in recent decades. They also cause profound challenges, 
not only for government but for democratic society in general.  
 
The causes of these changes have been variously ascribed to the decline of 
traditional class structures, rising affluence and higher levels of education, 
improved access to information, the growing power of the media, and changes 
to the political elite.2 All of these factors alter citizens’ behaviour, changing the 
way we approach decisions, our perceptions of the significance of our actions, 
and our expectations of outcomes.  
 
This report uses the insights of behavioural economics to examine citizen’s 
motivations for civic and civil engagement. As well as drawing on a growing 
theoretical literature, we conducted focus groups with citizens who, evidence 
suggests, are less likely to engage that the average, but who ‘buck the trend’. 
In doing so, we hoped to identify those motivational factors that led to 
engagement and which might have wider pertinence for policymakers. The 
first group comprised eight 16-25 years olds who regularly took part in 
activities related to civic activism, civic participation or civic consultation. The 
                                                     
1 Simon Griffiths, Goldsmiths, University of London, s.griffiths@gold.ac.uk; Beth Foley, St. Antony’s 
College, University of Oxford, beth.foley@sant.ox.ac.uk.   
2 See Russell J. Dalton, "Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment," The Journal of Politics, 46: 1 
(1984); Colin Hay, Gerry Stoker and Andy Williamson, "Revitalising Politics: Have We Lost the Plot?," 
(Paper presented at the Revitalising Politics: Have We Lost the Plot? conference, London: Hansard 
Society, November 5, 2008). 
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second consisted of eight individuals from a black and minority ethnic  
background (these participants were over the age of 25) who were involved in 
civic participation or civic consultation activities.  These focus groups provided 
us with specific case studies from which we have suggested some wider 
possibilities about the role of motivation and engagement in the UK.  
 
‘Citizen engagement’  
 
The idea of citizen engagement refers to citizens’ involvement in administering 
and overseeing the institutions providing ‘public goods’ (i.e. those that are 
defined as ‘non-excludable and non-rival’3 such as schools, hospitals, roads 
and parks). People’s engagement with the provision of public goods in the UK 
encompasses a very wide spectrum of activities, from voting or signing a 
petition, right through to serving as a local councillor or volunteering in the 
local community. For the purposes of this study, we divide engagement 
activities between the two categories4 set out in the Evidence Annex of the 
Department for Community and Local Government’s (DCLG) 2008 White 
Paper.5 
• Civil engagement includes all those activities which require citizens 
to engage with other citizens, such as volunteering.  
• Civic engagement signifies activities which involve interaction 
between the citizen and the state.6  
Data on political engagement collected by DCLG encompasses a very broad 
range of activities, from filling in a consultation questionnaire to volunteering 
for a community group and from voting to serving as a school governor. The 
range of activities classed as ‘civic’ (involving interaction between citizen and 
state) is broad, and The Citizenship Survey breaks these down into the 
following areas:  
• Civic activism: regular involvement either in direct decision-making 
about local services or issues, or in the actual provision of these 
3 Samuelson cited in Sarah Gillinson, Why Cooperate? A Multi-Disciplinary Study of Collective Action 
(London: Overseas Development Institute, 2004), 12; Joseph Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 
(New York: Norton & Co., 2000). 
4 Obviously, this divide between civil and civic engagement is not entirely clear-cut. A school governing 
body, for example, involves elements of civil and civic activities in that citizens who take part work both 
collaboratively with other governors, as well as interacting with the school’s staff and the local authority. 
However, these terms provide the best description of the two broad means through which engagement 
takes place. 
5 Department for Communities and Local Government, Evidence Annex - Communities in Control: Real 
People, Real Power (London: HMSO, 2008), 14. 
6 The state in this instance refers not simply to the central government, but to all institutions of national 
and local government, including public services. Civic activities might therefore include serving as a 
local councilor, attending a political protest or taking part in a consultation group on local services. 
10 
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services by taking on a role such as a local councillor, school 
governor, magistrate or special constable. 
• Civic consultation: active engagement in consultations about local 
services or issues through activities such as attending a consultation 
group or completing a questionnaire. 
• Civic participation: wider forms of interaction between citizen and 
state, such as contacting an elected representative, taking part in a 
public demonstration, or signing a petition. 
The figures on trends and participation rates analysed during this report focus 
on these categories – civic and civil engagement - and the activities they 
incorporate.  
 
The decline of traditional political engagement in the UK 
 
There has been a cultural shift in advanced industrial societies in recent 
decades, a process carefully mapped by sociologist, Ronald Inglehart and his 
colleagues. Changes in religious belief, attitudes to work, family life and 
sexuality are transforming political, social and economic life.7 In the UK 
shifting attitudes towards traditional forms of political participation are much 
discussed. In his study on changing patterns of participation, Paul Whiteley 
highlights two quotes, one from Almond and Verba’s study of British political 
culture undertaken in 1959, and the other from the retirement speech of Betty 
Boothroyd, the outgoing Speaker of the House of Commons, in 2000. While 
Almond and Verba refer to ‘norms supporting political activity’ and a ‘highly 
developed’ role for citizens or subjects, Boothroyd – speaking forty years later 
– warns that “the level of cynicism about Parliament, and the accompanying 
alienation of the young from the democratic process, is troubling.”8  
 
There has been a fall in levels of traditional political participation. Turnout for 
both local and national elections has experienced a steep decline. The 
General Election of 1950 saw a turnout of 83.9 per cent, yet figures have 
dropped dramatically, particularly after 1997, sinking to an all-time low of 59.4 
per cent in 2001 and only recovering slightly to reach 61.3 per cent in 2005. 
After 1998’s historic low of 28 per cent, turnout in local elections has hovered 
just above the 30 per cent mark, with some wards recording figures as low as 
12 per cent. Membership rates for political parties have seen a similar 
7 Ronald Inglehart, Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society (Princeton University Press, 1989) and 
subsequent work. 
8 Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 
315 and House of Commons Official Report, 26 July 2000, Cols 1113-14, cited in; Paul Whiteley, "The 
State of Participation in Britain," Parliamentary Affairs, 56 (2003). 
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collapse (see Figure 1.1): the proportion of the UK electorate who were 
members of one of the main political parties fell from 3.8 per cent in 1983 to 
just 1.3 per cent in 2005.9  
 
Figure 1.1: Party membership as a proportion of the UK electorate, 1964-
2005 
 
 
Source: Membership of UK Political Parties, House of Commons Research Report SN/SG 
5125, 2009, 11.  
 
Even compared to other European countries with relatively low rates of party 
membership, membership rates in the UK have declined faster, and have 
dropped lower, than all other European countries (see Figure 1.2) Similarly, in 
a global survey ranking countries according to electoral turnout, the political 
inclusion of disadvantaged or minority groups, membership of political parties, 
citizens’ stated interest in – and active engagement with – politics and political 
protest, and the efforts made by public institutions to promote political 
participation, the UK was found to have the lowest levels of political 
participation in the developed world.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 House of Commons, Research Report SN/SG/5125, Membership of UK Political Parties, by John 
Marshall (London: HMSO, 2009), 11. 
10 The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy 2008 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2008). 
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Figure 1.2: Trends in European Party Membership (low membership 
countries), 1961-2005 
 
 
Source: Membership of UK Political Parties, House of Commons Research Report SN/SG 
5125, 2009, 25. 
 
However, whilst measures of traditional forms of political engagement 
demonstrate a clear decline, this does not signify the wider collapse in political 
involvement. There is some evidence to suggest that traditional forms of civic 
engagement linking citizen and state are being replaced by less formal, non-
partisan forms of engagement. Higher levels of education and growing use of 
information technologies, particularly amongst young people, suggest party 
political divisions may be replaced by less traditional avenues of campaigning 
and political activity as new generations become politically involved.11 A 
recent survey found that whilst just 3 per cent of respondents had paid a 
membership fee to a political party, 37 per cent who had donated money to a 
charity or campaigning organisation, many of which are increasingly 
coordinated online.12 There is strong evidence that forms of web-based 
political participation are increasingly prevalent.13  
 
Evidence also suggests a latent desire amongst citizens to get more involved, 
which is currently untapped by policymakers. Figures from the 2009 Audit of 
Political Engagement and the Citizenship Survey reveal that, while 48 per cent 
of respondents reported they would like to be ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ involved in local 
                                                     
11 Dalton, "Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment", 266. Although, British citizens are still 
generally more likely to divide along partisan political lines than citizens of other industrialised nations. 
12 Hansard Society, Audit of Political Engagement 6: The 2009 Report, 25. 
13 A recent notably example being the use of social networking site, Twitter, to force the oil trading firm, 
Trafigura, to drop a high court injunction against the Guardian newspaper. David Leigh, 'Trafigura drops 
bid to gag Guardian over MP's question', The Guardian, Tuesday 13 October 2009. 
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/oct/13/trafigura-drops-gag-guardian-oil 
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decision-making, only 17 per cent had attended a public meeting or rally, 26 
per cent had been in contact with a local councillor and 22 per cent had been 
involved in a discussion group on local services or problems.14 In some 
senses, the new forms of engagement discussed by Inglehart will create 
opportunities for more people to take part in certain forms of collective action, 
particularly those relating to social networking, online communication and the 
collation of information. A move towards these channels of participation will 
provide a boost to certain aspects of social capital. Yet, in other ways, this 
shift will pose challenges, particularly for government. 
 
If participation is increasingly taking place independent of political institutions, 
there is a danger that lines of communication between citizens and politicians 
may be severed. In the light of the growing importance of citizen engagement, 
coupled with evidence on a decline in traditional forms of participation, the 
challenge for policymakers, political parties and governmental institutions will 
be to adapt to these changes, coming up with new ways of maintaining links 
with a more cognitively mobile and better informed public. If they are to do so 
successfully, they will need to be able to both understand and influence 
people’s political behaviour.  
 
Why does citizen engagement matter?  
 
Citizen engagement matters a variety of reasons. First, high levels of 
engagement are needed to ensure democratic legitimacy. Interaction between 
citizens and the state is an important part of a democratic system. As Dalton 
puts it: 
 
“Democracy expects an active citizenry because it is through 
discussion, popular interest and involvement in politics that societal 
goals should be defined and carried out in a democracy. Without public 
involvement in the process, democracy lacks both its legitimacy and its 
guiding force.”15 
 
At the local level, our political system depends on the voluntary involvement of 
citizens serving their community as councillors, magistrates, school governors 
and special constables. In turn, such posts rely on the backing of others for 
their legitimacy. Widespread apathy and abstention call the mandate of 
elected officials into question; local elections in the UK regularly see turnout 
14 Department for Communities and Local Government, Evidence Annex - Communities in Control: Real 
People, Real Power (London: HMSO, 2008). 
15 Russel J. Dalton, "Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior," Comparative Political Studies, 33: 6/7 
(2000), 927. 
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falling below 30 per cent and even the general election in 2001 saw more 
voters abstain than back the winning party. Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley refer to 
a “looming crisis of democratic accountability, which could pull parliament’s 
democratic mandate into question.16  
 
Second, modern public services rely on high levels of involvement if they are 
to work effectively. The most recent proposals on public service reform all 
centre on the ways in which the active involvement of users could serve as a 
tool to improve service outcomes. A recent report from the Public 
Administration Select Committee reported that citizen involvement in the 
provision of public services 
 
“reduces the risk of providing unsuitable or inappropriate services, as 
users will often be in the best position to judge their own needs. In 
addition, user involvement can encourage people to better understand 
their own service needs and improve their confidence. This, in turn, can 
have positive effects on the outcomes they want to see, such as 
improved health or educational progress.”17  
 
The government has been keen to pursue this agenda; as former Cabinet 
Office Minister Ed Miliband MP argued,  
 
“[p]ublic services must respond to and mobilise the expertise, ideas, 
time, and willpower of people using them. What I call the ‘letterbox 
model’ - where the service was just delivered to the user – doesn’t see 
us as participants who can shape our own lives”.18  
 
In recent years, there has been a sustained move towards the idea of ‘co-
production’ – sharing responsibility for public service delivery and outcomes 
between service users and providers.19  
 
Third, citizens’ involvement in the provision of public goods within their 
communities can enhance communal well-being and strengthen social ties.20 
16 Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley, "Citizenship and Civic Engagement: Attitudes and 
Behaviour in Britain," Political Studies, 51: 3 (2003), 443. 
17 Public Administration Select Committee, User Involvement in Public Services: Sixth Report of Session 
2007-08 (London: HMSO, 2008), 13. 
18 Ed Miliband, Speech to 5th Annual Guardian Public Services Summit, 7 February 2008 in House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee, User Involvement in Public Services (London: 
HMSO, 2007) 9. 
19 Simon Griffiths, Beth Foley and Jessica Prendergrast, Assertive Citizens: New relationships in the 
public services (London: SMF, 2009) 
20 Mandeep Hothi, Neighbourliness + Empowerment = Wellbeing: Is There a Formula for Happy 
Communities? (London: The Young Foundation, 2008). 
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As Bekkers puts it, “citizens participate in voluntary associations not only to 
advocate their interests in politics, but also to find meaning in life, to express 
their social identity, to contribute to the well-being of others and to improve the 
chances on the labour market – among many other things.”21  
 
Who engages?  
 
In terms of the UK’s domestic political culture, one of the more concerning 
aspects of the transformation of civic and civil engagement is that it has left us 
with a situation in which there are significant discrepancies between rates of 
participation across different sectors of society. Yet, without a suitably 
representative cross-section of the community engaging politically, there is a 
danger that of the needs and views of that subset of the population who do 
engage are prioritised above others.  
 
Certain groups now record levels of engagement which are noticeably lower 
than average. The data collected by CLG suggests that these trends are most 
pronounced among young people, aged between 18 and 25 (figure 1.3), and 
those from black or minority ethnic backgrounds (figure 1.4).  
 
Figure 1.3: Participation by form and ethnicity 
 
 
 
                                                     
21 Rene Bekkers, "Participation in Voluntary Associations: Relations With Resources, Personality, and 
Political Values," Political Psychology, 26: 3 (2005), 439. The positive effects of such ‘social capital’ 
have been most notably articulated in recent years by the American political scientist, Robert Putnam. 
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Source: Communities and Local Government, Citizenship Survey: April 2008-March 2009 - 
England and Wales (London: HMSO, 2009). 
 
Figure 1.4 Participation by form and age 
 
 
16-24 yrs 
 
Source: Communities and Local Government, Citizenship Survey: April 2008-March 2009 - 
England and Wales. 
 
As figure 1.3 shows, rates of civic participation, consultation and activism are 
lower for younger people that the wider population. Figure 1.4 shows a slightly 
more complicated picture, but it is notable that there are lower rates of 
consultation and participation amongst black and minority ethnic groups that 
the white population. If those participating are to be as representative of the 
17 
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communities they serve as possible it will be the task of policymakers to 
address these gaps.  
 
This report is in line with the delivery strategy for Public Service Agreement 
number 15 (PSA 15), the third indicator of which was focused on the 
participation in public life of disadvantaged groups. The Agreement states: “all 
groups within society should have the opportunity to participate in community 
activities, but disabled people, people from ethnic minorities, and young 
people are under-represented in civic activities and decision-making roles.”22  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the importance of political engagement for modern 
governments and has also discussed the recent trends which have 
contributed to a decline in traditional channels of participation. Although falling 
rates of citizen engagement could have major repercussions for government – 
in terms of democratic legitimacy, public service provision and social cohesion 
– policymakers are struggling to reverse the trend. Doing so successfully will 
require a full assessment of the drivers of behaviour in this area. We therefore 
turn to the theory of behavioural economics as a useful model for analysing 
engagement behaviour.   
22 HM Treasury, PSA Delivery Agreement 15 (London: HMSO, 2009), 5. 
18 
 
Foley and Griffiths | Engaging Behaviour | Social Market Foundation | Page 19 
 
 
Chapter 2: Insights from behavioural economics 
Main messages 
This chapter sets out some of the assumptions of rational choice theory, the 
approach to much public policy, and questions its usefulness in examining 
citizen engagement. However, we also recognise some of the limits to 
behavioural economics. We then set out the framework used in this report to 
assess the drivers of engagement: which we describe as external, internal 
and social. Whilst external drivers are included in rational choice approaches 
the others are not. Finally we set out the methodology used in this report and 
give details of the focus groups we carried out.  
While a great deal has been written on the decline of political engagement, 
both in the UK and in the developed world, this study takes an innovative 
approach to analysing the problem by drawing on insights from behavioural 
economics. Recent work supported by the Economic and Social Research 
Council in this area argues that “little is known about the link between 
interventions designed to stimulate participation, the level and depth of civic 
engagement and policy outcomes”.23 Whilst the work of the Economic and 
Social Research Council-sponsored project will complement this study, its 
main findings will be published after this report.  
The discipline of behavioural economics has attracted a great deal of interest 
in recent years, particularly in policy circles. Much of its appeal lies in a 
gradual appreciation of two facts: that meeting many of the modern 
challenges confronting policymakers will rely on persuading individuals to 
change their behaviour; and that many of these behaviours cannot be 
addressed through the traditional reliance on market-based incentives and 
disincentives.24  
The traditional, market-based tools of policymaking are closely bound up with 
a model of human behaviour known as rational choice theory. This model 
forms the mainstay of classical economics. Rational choice theory makes a 
number of important assumptions about the decision-making process, namely 
that individuals are essentially both rational and self-interested. In any given 
situation, they are therefore most likely to adopt the course of action which 
maximises the benefits which accrue to them, and minimises the losses – 
both financial and non-financial.  
                                                     
23 For more information see: 
www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/ViewAwardPage.aspx?awardnumber=RES-177-25-0002 
24 Jessica Prendergrast et al., Creatures of Habit? (London: Social Market Foundation, 2008), 10. 
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Economics is the social science of choice for policymakers. This has led to the 
dominance of the rational choice paradigm in policymaking. Typically 
therefore, policy responses to issues such as smoking-related illnesses, 
obesity or savings and pensions have employed financial incentives or 
disincentives (subsidies, taxes, tax relief) or offered additional information to 
highlight the rationality of certain choices. These tools all manipulate the 
‘external factors’ of cost, effort and information. The heavy reliance on these 
kinds of initiatives reflects an embedded assumption that individuals should be 
conceived of as rational economic actors.25 
Such measures continue to form the mainstay of policymaking and, in many 
respects, are effective. However, there has been a growing realisation that 
policymakers’ reliance solely on the predictions of a rational actor model of 
behaviour may “constitute an incomplete basis for deciding how to help 
consumers make the right decisions”.26 Behavioural economics offers a 
broader view. Unlike other psychological or sociological theories of 
behavioural change – which tend to sideline economic arguments – 
behavioural economics instead makes adaptations to conventional rational 
choice theory and combines learning from the disciplines of psychology and 
sociology with traditional neoclassical economic theory, offering insights into 
the impact of the full range of drivers on people’s behaviour.27 
These adaptations to the neoclassical approach do not, it should be noted, 
imply a wholesale rejection of an economics grounded in ideas of utility 
maximization, equilibrium, and efficiency.28 Rather, as prominent behavioural 
economists Colin Camerer and George Loewenstein have argued: 
“Often these departures [from the conventional model] are not radical 
at all because they relax simplifying assumptions that are not central to 
the economic approach. For example, there is nothing in core 
neoclassical theory that specifies that people should not care about 
fairness, that they should weight risky outcomes in a linear fashion, or 
that they must discount the future exponentially at a constant rate. 
Other assumptions simply acknowledge human limits on computational 
power, willpower, and self-interest.”29 
At the heart of behavioural economic analysis is a simple and intuitive 
message: in going about their daily lives, people are guided by impulse, habit, 
25 Ibid.,  10. 
26 Daniel Read, Behavioural Economics (Unpublished, no date), 5. 
27 Prendergrast et al., Creatures of Habit?, 10.  
28 Colin F Camerer and George Loewenstein, Behavioural Economics (Pasadena, CA: Caltech, 2002), 
1.  
29 Ibid.,  2. 
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emotions, cognitive limitations, and issues such as perceived fairness and 
social norms, as much as by the availability of information, or a desire to 
minimise costs and maximise material payoffs.30 It also emphasises (as 
indeed did Adam Smith) that, contrary to much classical economic theory, we 
act in a social context and that issues such as social approval and status are 
central motivations of human behaviour.31 
The behavioural economics literature therefore considers the actions and 
behaviours of Herbert Simon’s homo psychologicus32 and Emile Durkheim’s 
homo sociologicus33 and seeks to incorporate these into a traditional rational 
choice analysis of man as homo economicus. This more holistic model of 
human behaviour is contrasted with the behavioural assumptions of rational 
choice theory by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler in their recent bestseller 
Nudge.34 This more holistic model acknowledges that people, as behavioural 
economist, Daniel Read, points out: 
“ignore important decision factors, put undue weight on some factors 
relative to others, plan to do the right thing but fail to follow through with 
those plans, they are more sure about their decisions or beliefs than 
they should be, they trust others more than they should, and they even 
fail to do simple calculations that could solve important problems.”35 
The effect of these tendencies is that people sometimes make decisions that 
are “seemingly irrational”.36 For example, a rational choice analysis might 
suggest that voluntary participation in collective action is not in fact rational. 
The act of voting or taking part in a consultation group on local services offers 
few direct, selective incentives to the participant (given the numbers involved 
in these activities, it is highly unlikely that their voice will prove decisive) and 
taking part comes at significant costs in terms of time and effort.  
If policymakers are to be successful in raising rates of engagement they will 
need to look at the full range of drivers of behaviour in this area and seek to 
construct policies which build on these motivations. As Elster claims, “we do 
not seem to have any robust understanding of the relation between the two 
homunculi to be found within each of us – homo economicus and homo 
30 Kjell Arne Brekke and Olof Johansson-Stenman, The Behavioural Economics of Climate Change 
(Gothenburg: School of Buiness, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, 2008), 3; Prendergrast 
et al., Creatures of Habit?, 6. 
31 Ibid.,  3. 
32 Herbert Simon, "Human Nature in Politics," American Political Science Review, 79 (1985). 
33 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1893).  
34 Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler, Nudge (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008). 
35 Read, Behavioural Economics, 4-5. 
36 Brekke and Johansson-Stenman, The Behavioural Economics of Climate Change, 3. 
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sociologicus.”37 It is for this reason that the wider spectrum of factors 
incorporated by behavioural economics might offer some important insights 
into policymakers interested in political behaviour.  
Some limits to behavioural economics  
There are limits to the behavioural economic approach and areas where its 
application is more appropriate than others. The first of these limitations is 
based around the arguable illiberalism of behavioural economics, whereas the 
second concerns behavioural economics’ relative silence about the structural 
problems and challenges that affect behaviour.  
The first issue concerns freedom and behavioural economic approaches. 
Alongside the question of what drives human behaviour in a variety of policy 
spheres and how to alter consequent behaviours is the question of whether 
and in what circumstances government should be seeking to intervene and 
change behaviours. In this context there is a considerable debate about the 
extent to which behavioural economics and the solutions it implies are 
inherently paternalistic: policymakers chose options (or at least set defaults) 
that citizens would have chosen at their most rational or that are in the 
collective interest.38 In some arenas there is a relative consensus on the 
appropriateness of intervention; in others the legitimacy of government action 
is hotly contested.  
For example, many people would agree with John Stuart Mill’s dictum that 
governments should intervene to resolve situations in which the self-interested 
actions of individuals result in clear and direct harm to others.39 One recent 
example might be the national smoking ban. However, where individual 
behaviours are indirectly damaging, where resultant harm occurs at a future 
date or inter-generationally, or the extent of harm is contested, government 
intervention is more contentious. Many are wary of any attempts by 
government to use policy to direct people to what it thinks are the ‘right’ 
courses of action, regardless of whether current behaviour carries ‘harmful’ 
social implications. 
The second concern with behavioural economics is its relative silence over 
structural challenges. Behavioural economics, under this criticism, provides a 
method of ‘blame shifting’. ‘Querulous citizens’40 do not behave in the ways 
37 Elster, "Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action", 141. 
38 At its most extreme this is a simple case of following Isaiah Berlin’s famous warning about the 
dangers of positive liberty, as he understood it. 
39 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Oxford: OUP), 1859, pp. 21-22 
40 Peter Taylor-Gooby, C.L. Hastie, and C. Bromley, ‘Querulous Citizens: Welfare Knowledge and the 
Limits to Welfare Reform’, Social Policy & Administration, 37 (1) 2003 
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that government expects and wants them to. Yet governments are elected 
promising certain outcomes: an end to child poverty, a fall in the national 
levels of indebtedness or antisocial behaviour; a rise in citizen engagement 
and so on. To behavioural economists it is the behaviour of individual citizens 
that needs to change to meet these targets.  
Behavioural economics has little or nothing to say about structures, from a 
class-bound society which severely limits opportunity, to a political system 
which fails to reflect the views of much of the population. Responsibility for 
change is shifted from government to citizen, whilst the structural impediments 
to successful outcomes remain unaltered. Whilst this project draws on many 
of the important insights from behavioural economics, and examines the 
external, social and internal factors that motivate engagement, questions 
around structural barriers to engagement are largely outside its scope.  
A more holistic view of behavioural drivers 
This report seeks to highlight the potential of behavioural economics to 
provide insights for policymakers attempting to increase rates of political 
engagement. Intuitively, it might be expected that a group of people with a 
common interest would naturally come together to pursue that goal. However, 
this assumption is explicitly rejected by rational choice theory. The application 
of the rational choice model to the idea of collective action – most notably set 
out in the work of Mancur Olson – concludes that individuals will only 
cooperate in a very limited number of circumstances, after careful assessment 
of the costs and benefits they stand to accrue by doing so.  
An analysis of engagement behaviour based around costs and benefits clearly 
has some predictive power; evidence suggests that people are more willing to 
take part in one-off, low cost activities, for example. However, given the very 
limited number of scenarios in which collective action can reasonably occur, 
the model clearly fails to encompass the broader variety of factors which 
influence our engagement behaviour. 
There have been few attempts so far to examine the empirical studies on 
behavioural economics beyond their potential to influence one-off, rapidly-
taken or yes/no decisions.  ‘Nudging’ someone into signing up for a pension or 
acting as a blood donor is a much simpler ambition, and therefore process, 
than eliciting a sustained change in behaviour that survives with time – as is 
required in the behaviours associated with political engagement.  
Consequently, while there have been numerous behavioural economic studies 
on voting behaviour – one example of a relatively simple, yes/no decision – 
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these have not been expanded to encompass activities such as volunteering 
or taking part in a protest.  
Analysis of ‘deeper’ forms of engagement activity requires a more nuanced 
understanding of the drivers of behaviour than is often discussed. We use the 
framework of behavioural economics to draw out a more accurate and holistic 
overview of the factors affecting engagement behaviour, particularly those 
generally neglected by rational choice theory. Our approach is to consider the 
external, internal and social drivers of behaviour in turn:  
• External drivers refer to those traditionally at the forefront of rational 
choice approaches. They include the factors that a self-interested actor 
might consider when weighing up a decision on a cost-benefit basis. 
On these terms, financial costs plus the time and effort required are set 
against the ease, desirability and perceived effectiveness of the 
potential outcome.  
• Internal drivers refer to the array of biases and cognitive tendencies 
common to much human decision-making.  
• Social drivers reflect our propensity to adjust our behaviour according 
to the actions, perceptions and expectations of those around us. 
Considering the interactions between these various drivers allows 
policymakers to gain a more holistic and comprehensive understanding 
of why people behave as they do and, crucially, how to change this. 
Behavioural economics does not seek to make prior assumptions about what 
consumers do (as rational choice theory does) but rather develops models 
based on empirical observations.41  This report takes a similar approach.  We 
first explore the model of behaviour grounded in a rational choice theory 
interpretation, and the evidence on the appropriateness of this paradigm in 
the field of political engagement. Against this backdrop, we then consider 
what the literature indicates about the possible incorporation of psychological 
and sociological drivers, in order to identify where the insights of behavioural 
economics may apply. 
Methodology and research focus  
 
The behavioural economic literature offers a wide variety of factors, beyond 
those addressed by rational choice theory, which may play a role in 
individuals’ choices on political participation. However, there has been 
relatively little empirical assessment of the extent of the role played by these 
41 Read, Behavioural Economics, 12. 
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drivers. While the statistical evidence presents a variety of data on the 
reasons why people might choose not to engage, the reasons why those 
currently involved actually choose to do so have been less well explored. If 
policymaking in this area is to be successful it must expand its remit from 
simply removing the obvious barriers to engagement. There is a clear need to 
ensure that policy builds on the ways in which citizens do engage.  
 
For this reason, we decided to focus our primary research on this area, 
conducting focus groups to explore the motivations of those who currently 
take part in activities DCLG defines as being associated with political 
engagement. As discussed in Chapter 1, patterns of political engagement are 
not consistent across all sectors of society. Young people and those from 
black and minority ethnic backgrounds, in particular, tend to record lower than 
average rates of participation. We therefore decided to use the focus groups 
to explore the motivations people who both engaged politically and came from 
one of these two groups – i.e. those who are currently engaging, but who we 
might not expect to.  
 
We can gain a more detailed picture of trends in the participation rates of 
young people and those from black and minority ethnic groups by taking a 
breakdown of Citizenship Survey data based on the types of activities being 
undertaken. Figures 1.3 and 1.4 above suggest that, while young people 
record lower levels of participation across the board, rates of civic activism are 
in fact relatively high amongst black and minority ethnic groups, yet lower for 
consultation and wider participation activities. For this reason, we decided to 
use the focus groups to explore the factors at play in the types of activities for 
which a given group recorded lower levels of engagement.  
 
Two focus groups were held by Penn, Schoen and Berland on behalf of the 
Social Market Foundation. The focus groups were held on August 11 2009 in 
St Albans. The first group was comprised of eight 18-25 years olds who 
regularly took part in civic activism, civic participation or civic consultation. The 
second group was comprised of eight 25-60 year olds from a black and 
minority ethnic background, who were involved in civic participation or civic 
consultation.  Participants came from a range of social classes and carried out 
a range of different forms of engagement. Findings were discussed and 
conclusions developed through a roundtable discussion with academics, 
policymakers and practitioners held in London in November 2009.   
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out the potential insights that behavioural economics could 
offer to the understanding individuals’ decisions to engage. The framework of 
external, internal and social factors can now be applied to the empirical and 
theoretical findings of studies into citizen engagement, to draw out a more 
holistic assessment of the various drivers involved. In doing so, a number of 
alternatives to the dominant model of rational choice-based policymaking can 
be explored.  
26 
 Chapter 3: External drivers  
Main messages 
This chapter sets out some of the short-comings of focusing too narrowly on 
the costs and benefits to individuals in explaining behaviour (a failure of some 
forms of rational choice theory). However, it also accepts that external factors 
do play a part in people’s decision to engage. In particular, our focus groups 
showed that the main external cost to engagement was around time, not 
money; whilst the benefits were often around career-building activities.  
In this chapter, we examine some of the external drivers that motivate citizens 
to engage. These approaches are traditionally at the forefront of rational 
choice approaches to politics, as noted above, and include financial costs, 
time and effort, and effectiveness of the potential outcome. We begin with a 
theoretical discussion of rational choice approaches, before examining the 
type of external motivations that arose in our primary research.  
 
As we have seen, policymaking has traditionally been heavily reliant on the 
rational choice model as a basis for behavioural analysis and, as Pattie, Seyd 
and Whiteley point out, under these assumptions civic engagement should 
therefore, under these assumptions, only occur “where the costs of 
involvement are low and the benefits of successful action are high.”42 
 
Rational choice in policymaking  
 
The design of recent policies and initiatives on political engagement reveal an 
emphasis on the cost-benefit model of human decision-making. The focus is 
largely on boosting resources for, and reducing the perceived ‘costs’ of 
engagement. The prime example of this latter point is the relaxation of rules 
on postal voting, which has seen a substantial increase in its use. There has 
also been a strong emphasis on facilitating people’s access to the information 
and resources which might allow them to become more politically engaged.  
 
This has involved greater use of new technologies to disseminate information, 
the provision of free training for community groups and the creation of 
organisational templates or toolkits. The 2008 Empowerment White Paper 
made a number of provisions in this regard, with a new initiative for local 
authorities to provide ‘timely information to citizens’ and the introduction of 
‘digital mentors’ in deprived communities to boost residents’ ability to access 
                                                     
42 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, "Citizenship and Civic Engagement: Attitudes and Behaviour in Britain", 
443-444. 
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information online.43 Recent announcements have also seen sharp increases 
in funds and budgets on offer to community groups; community asset 
management and participatory budgeting are high on the agenda, with 
£500,000 on offer for Community Safety initiatives and a new £4m Community 
Fund, plus a number of other schemes including Grassroots Grants, Green 
Neighbourhoods and Neighbourhood Councils offering direct funding.  
 
Regulation is another frequent fallback for policymaking. The Government’s 
empowerment agenda includes the creation of statutory duties for local 
authorities and public services to engage with citizens and “reach agreement” 
– rather than simply consult – as exemplified in the Sustainable Communities 
Act (2007).44 The Local Democracy, Economic Development and 
Construction Bill (2009) also imposes on local authorities a duty to respond to 
petitions and to involve the public to the greatest poss
 
The most explicit reliance on a rational choice-based interpretation of 
motivations has been exhibited in discussions around selective incentives. 
While this has not yet been extensively applied in the field of political 
engagement, many local authorities have begun to use prize draws as a spur 
to encourage residents to take part in consultation activities, and there has 
been plenty of discussion around the use of similar rewards for voters. Those 
in favour of such moves juxtapose the use of incentives with the alternative of 
compulsion, arguing that, as Tony Wright MP put it, we should “reward civic 
virtue, not punish civic vice”.45 No voting incentives have so far been trialled in 
British elections but the 2007 report of the Councillors Commission 
recommended using small incentives in local government elections, such as 
offering voters the opportunity to enter a lottery.46  
The issue has raised some disquiet amongst politicians. Former Shadow 
Communities Minister Eric Pickles described the idea as “bribes” for voters.47 
Leaving aside the polemic, there is a serious point here: in a context where, 
rationally conceived, the actual benefit of voting for the individual is negligible, 
any voter who turns out encouraged by a monetary reward will be explicitly 
voting for reasons unrelated to democratic accountability. Consequently, any 
higher turnout induced by such measures cannot be taken as a sign of 
43 Department for Communities and Local Government, Communities in Control: Real People, Real 
Power (London: HMSO, 2008). 
44 Local Works Briefing Notes on the Act www.localworks.org/?q=node/4  and “Sustainable 
Communities Act 2007: A Guide” www.communities.gov.uk/documents/localgovernment/pdf/681480.pdf 
45 Electoral Reform Society, "Incentive Voting", www.electoral-reform.org.uk/article.php?id=47.  
46 Councillors Commission, Representing the Future, 61. 
47 Jill Sherman, "Voters to Get IPod 'Bribe' to Beat Local Election Apathy," the Times, July 10, 2008, 
www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article4305322.ece. 
28 
 
Foley and Griffiths | Engaging Behaviour | Social Market Foundation | Page 29 
 
 
enhanced legitimacy – a key aim of the focus on raising turnout.  Moreover, it 
appears this kind of sentiment may be shared by the electorate more widely: a 
referendum in Arizona on a proposal to offer a cash prize to a voter picked 
from a lottery at each election was – somewhat ironically – rejected by voters 
during the 2006 mid-term elections. 
Some shortcomings of the rational choice model 
 
The disquiet around the application of a rational choice framework to efforts to 
boost political engagement indicates some divergence on the types of 
motivations which people believe should, and do, operate in this area. The 
drivers of engagement behaviour are as significant, in terms of desired 
outcomes, as the action itself. While costs and benefits clearly have some 
impact on the types of activities people are prepared to engage in, as 
discussed above, the rational choice model can provide few insights on the 
reasons why those who do so choose to participate. Yet evidence suggests 
motivations for engagement are reasonably powerful. Putting aside headlines 
on voter apathy and lack of trust, the recent figures on engagement reveal 
that the numbers of people making the active choice to engage are significant 
(as Chapter 1 showed).  
 
Given the variety of evidence to suggest that rational choice theory has limited 
use as a predictor of engagement behaviour, the issues were explored with 
the focus groups conducted as part of this research. What role, if any, did 
rational choice analysis play in their decisions on participation? When 
presented with the rational choice analysis  (that most individuals will choose 
not to engage, since the costs clearly outweigh the benefits they stand to 
accrue through free-riding – i.e. consuming more than their fair share of a 
public resource or shoulder less than a fair share of the costs of its 
production) the response was overwhelmingly dismissive. One participant 
argued that the conclusion that one should free-ride, relying on others to 
choose to contribute, ‘did not make logical sense’. Participants did not view as 
logical a response which relied on others choosing differently, but instead felt 
a rational choice would be to lead by example.  
 
Interestingly, however, the cost-benefit analysis at the forefront of the rational 
model was not considered to be entirely irrelevant. No participants raised the 
issue of the ‘costs’ of engagement unprompted but all were responsive when 
questioned directly on the costs and benefits of engagement. While it 
appeared most group members had not undertaken any assessment of the 
costs and benefits before they became involved, most reported that the costs 
and benefits became clearer after they began to participate. Also, while costs 
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were mentioned, all participants felt they accrued a variety of direct personal 
benefits, although many of these were less tangible than the direct or concrete 
personal gains discussed in rational choice models.  
 
External drivers: costs and benefits  
 
Despite rational choice theory’s calculation that the costs of collective action 
will generally outweigh the benefits, the drawbacks were not pronounced 
enough to be raised unprompted by participants. When asked by the group 
administrator to discuss their perceptions of the costs they incurred through 
participation, however, the key aspect raised was, unsurprisingly, time. 
Younger group members spoke of the impact these commitments had on their 
social life. In particular, those involved in more traditional civic activities found 
that their involvement tended to increase, quickly spreading into other areas: 
 
“I became a governor in October and by December I was involved in 
three other subcommittees”    
Group 1: Young people  
 
“I do it [volunteer] on a Friday evening until 9pm and your friends are 
texting you inviting you out and you can’t go”    
Group 1: Young people 
 
As both of these focus group members found an initial decision to engage, 
quickly ‘snowballed’ and became a bigger and bigger part of their lives. For 
the first member, in particular, a decision to get involved to boost her career 
prospects quickly became more and more demanding on her time as she took 
on new roles.  
 
Other than the time and effort involved, there were few mentions of other 
costs. Financial costs, for example, were negligible, though a few participants 
spoke of the emotional costs; one member of the black and minority ethnic 
group reported that his involvement with a local youth group in a deprived 
area had “opened my eyes to a sense of injustice, which has kept me up 
some nights”.  
 
In strong contrast to standard rational choice theories on collective action, all 
focus group participants were very vocal about the benefits they acquired 
through engaging, which most believed outweighed any costs. Interestingly, 
altruism did not feature prominently in these discussions; all participants felt 
they were receiving personal benefits from their engagement, with ‘personal 
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satisfaction’ the most common phrase used. There was some division, 
however, on the nature of these personal benefits. For most of the young 
people there was some consensus that the main benefits were linked to a 
sense of efficacy – witnessing the visible results of their efforts and the sense 
of recognition and status they gained from taking part. For older members of 
the black and minority ethnic group in particular, their satisfaction was less 
closely tied to results and status and more to the act of participation itself. 
When asked whether they would continue to take part in their activities if they 
felt their contribution was not making a tangible difference, many claimed they 
would continue to do so.  
 
“Getting benefits out of what you do is inevitable – but I wouldn’t call it 
selfish if you go in wanting to get benefits – that is a desire for personal 
growth” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
“You always think that you don’t want to do that – but then afterwards 
when you see that your opinion was heard and you start to change 
things then it makes it seem worthwhile” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
“Just walking down the street and getting that recognition gives me a 
great feeling” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
“The satisfaction comes from me knowing I am doing something and 
giving my time and resources.” 
Group 2: Black and minority ethnic  
 
This evidence throws up certain questions around the usefulness of rational 
choice theory as an explanatory model. Firstly, an analysis of the costs and 
benefits appears to have little to do with the initial triggers of engagement 
behaviour. Secondly, even once costs and benefits of an activity become 
more evident, they do not appear to reflect the calculation envisaged by 
rational choice economists. There is clearly a wider range of incentives at play 
than narrow self-interest, and even where personal benefits are discussed 
they tend to be less tangible than the direct, material rewards associated with 
rational choice theory.  
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Conclusion 
 
So where does this contradictory evidence leave the rational choice model of 
collective action? Rothenberg argues that the rational choice model analysis 
rests on “a trio of very strong assumptions: (1) that individuals have full 
information; (2) that they are only interested in economic rewards and (3) that 
they maximise without error.”48 All three are obviously rarely realised in the 
real world. They point to the two main omissions of rational choice theory 
which we will explore in the following sections. Conditions 1 and 3 are related 
to the realities of the human decision-making process, limited as it is by our 
cognitive capabilities and swayed by the effects of behavioural biases. 
Condition 2 highlights the fact that – even if conditions 1 and 3 were met and 
the ideal decision-maker did exist – the rational choice model may still not 
form a complete picture of all the motivations which might induce an individual 
to engage.  
 
48 Lawrence S. Rothenberg, Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 19.  
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Chapter 4: Internal drivers 
Main messages 
This chapter examines the ways in which individuals make decisions in 
practice. We do not have the time to weigh up the costs and benefits of each 
action, therefore, we use a variety of shortcuts to help us come to decisions. 
This is relevant when examining how we engage. From the literature and 
focus groups several decision-making shortcuts were discussed. First, we 
found that force of habit is a powerful indicator of whether an individual 
continues to engage. Second, individuals are often motivated by loss aversion 
rather than by what they could gain. This raises real challenges for 
government in a time of cuts to public services. Third, we tend to honour 
publicly-stated commitments. This technique is used by a variety of 
organisations that rely on individuals’ involvement. Last, self-perception is an 
important driver of engagement: we engage if we feel that we are the ‘type of 
person’ that gets involved one issue or another or we see others ‘like us’ 
acting.  
In this study, we use the term ‘internal factors’ to encompass all the common 
behavioural biases and cognitive limitations which prevent the reality of 
human decision-making from reflecting the rational model. Instead, the 
formation of our intentions and their translation into action remain subject to 
the influence of common behavioural traits, or ‘heuristics’. These biases 
frequently create what are referred to by behavioural economists as ‘attitude-
behaviour gaps’; a disconnect between our stated intentions and the reality of 
our actions.  
 
One thing to note is that, in general, a reliance on decision-making heuristics 
is not necessarily irrational. Given the number of decisions the average 
individual takes every day, coupled with the volume of information they would 
have to process in order to consider themselves ‘fully informed’ on each 
decision, the costs of taking each decision on the basis of a rational, cost-
benefit analysis tend to become unfeasibly high. The use of cognitive 
shortcuts can often prove a quick and effective means of negotiating choices, 
particularly repeated or ‘on-the-spot’ decisions. Our use of heuristics is 
evident in all areas of life, for example continually selecting the same brand of 
toothpaste (even if others may offer better value for money).  
 
However, such is the pervasive nature of these cognitive shortcuts that they 
may also begin to affect the way we approach more significant, less routine 
decisions. The political arena is no exception; Kuklinski and Quirk cite some of 
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the most common heuristics at play in American political decision-making as 
being: “attributing issue positions on the basis of a candidate’s demographics 
or those of his supporters; using evidence about personal character to make 
inferences about political character; assuming that the president controls the 
economy; and using returns in early presidential primaries as evidence on the 
candidates’ merit.”49  
 
There is some dispute over the quality of decisions made on the basis of 
these common political heuristics. Some authors, such as Dalton, believe the 
use of decision-making heuristics “can lead to reasonable political choices in 
most instances.”50 Kuklinski and Quirk, on the other hand, remain more 
sceptical, stating that “people often lack the contextual knowledge to use 
heuristics intelligently, or in fact use them at all.”51 This debate suggests a 
need for identifying the political heuristics at play in any given situation. When 
attempting to engage the public in negotiation on specific and technical policy 
matters there also needs to be recognition that – given the complexity of 
information they may be required to process – heuristics are likely to play a 
prominent role in their choices.  
 
Shortcuts for decision making 
 
In this section we examine the common decision making heuristics. Perhaps 
the most powerful heuristic is the force of habit. Many of our decisions are 
based not simply on present or future costs and benefits, but on the choices 
we have taken when faced with similar decisions in the past. This is 
particularly evident in decisions to engage which take place repeatedly, like 
voting. As Fowler highlights,  
 
“studies of cohort and age effects on turnout…suggest that voting 
behaviour is persistent over time and related to past behaviour… 
Notice, for example, the turnout behaviour of respondents in the 1972, 
1974 and 1976 panels of the National Election Study. About 70% of the 
respondents in this sample either voted in all three elections or 
abstained in all three of them.”52  
 
In his study on variations in voting behaviour between different generations, 
Goerres also found that non-political factors were most important in explaining 
49 James H. Kuklinski and Paul J. Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and 
Mass Opinion (Illinois: University of Illinois, 1998), 3-4. 
50 Dalton, "Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior", 921. 
51 Kuklinski and Quirk, Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion, 6. 
52 James Fowler, "Habitual Voting and Behavioural Turnout," The Journal of Politics, 68: 2 (2006), 338. 
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the higher turnout of older voters, and that these factors were closely linked to 
the process of habituation.53 He pointed out that “voters are influenced by 
their own past political behaviour. If a person is mobilised to go and vote in 
one election, he or she will have a higher likelihood of going to the polls in the 
next election.”54  
 
Outcomes from the focus groups with young and black and minority ethnic 
participants revealed a number of instances in which internal biases could 
potentially influence engagement behaviour. The way in which behaviour 
becomes habitualised was particularly evident. Participants – particularly 
those who engaged via traditional channels, such as school governors or 
activists within the church – reported that their initial involvement quickly 
extended into other areas, including contact with elected officials and 
attendance at public meetings. The specific form their involvement took 
gradually became less important than the process of participation itself. When 
asked on the potential consequences if she could no longer participate 
through her church, one member of the black and minority ethnic group 
replied, “even if it wasn’t in a formal way, I would do it in an informal way.” 
 
As well as the wide-ranging influence of habits, there are a number of other 
common cognitive shortcuts evident in all aspects of decision-making 
behaviour. A first example is the role of loss aversion. Experiments reveal that 
most people display a tendency to place far more value on what they currently 
own than the value they placed on acquiring it in the first place.55 In the case 
of engagement, Jordan and Maloney identify a variant of this tendency in what 
they term the ‘minimax regret bias’.56 Rather than viewing collective action as 
a simple means to achieve public ‘goods’, they suggest many people 
participate to avoid collective ‘bads’. We choose to vote, for example, to guard 
against the regret we might feel if the outcome was worse than our present 
situation, rather than to seize an opportunity to improve current arrangements. 
Platt’s study of political engagement amongst the African-American population 
in the United States found that people were particularly galvanised when 
facing a perceived external threat to their current situation.57  
53 Achim Goerres, "Why Are Older People More Likely to Vote? The Impact of Ageing on Electoral 
Turnout in Europe," British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9 (2007), 109. 
54 Goerres, "Why Are Older People More Likely to Vote? The Impact of Ageing on Electoral Turnout in 
Europe", 111. 
55 Daniel Kahneman et al., “Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem,” 
Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990), 1325–48, cited in Colin F. Camerer and George Loewenstein, 
“Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future” (2002 draft). 
56 Grant Jordan and William Maloney, "How Bumble-Bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest 
Participation," Political Studies, 44 (1996), 17. 
57 Matthew B. Platt, "Participation for What? A Policy-Motivated Approach to Political Activism," Political 
Behavior, 30: 3 (2008), 394. 
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The focus groups provided some evidence that loss aversion acted as a 
significant driver for engagement. Several participants mentioned their desire 
to engage had been triggered by the threat of a ‘negative’ event – for 
example, the removal of local amenities. A member of the young people’s 
group was spurred to action by plans to demolish a local skate park, which 
she had used as a teenager. In several cases, evidence from the focus 
groups implied that it was not so much a careful balance of positives and 
negatives that triggered engagement, but the heavy weighting of negatives 
that led to action.  
 
Another common behavioural bias is our tendency to honour our stated 
commitments. We are much more likely to undertake an action if we have 
previously publicly committed to do so in some way, regardless of the costs 
and benefits involved.58 In their analysis of civic engagement behaviour, 
Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley found that “people who are asked to undertake a 
particular action are more likely to be civically active than those who are not”. 
While stating commitment to a course of action increases the likelihood we will 
undertake it, this tendency is particularly marked when those who have 
requested this commitment are people who we value and respect, such as a 
close friend, a family member or someone in a position of authority.59 They 
conclude that these kinds of mobilisation mechanisms are vital to raising 
participation levels; “exhortations to virtue are unlikely to success. Invitations 
to participate in (specific) activities may well be more successful. If you don’t 
ask, you don’t get.”60 
 
In the focus groups there was also a clear desire from participants to honour 
commitments once they had made them, particularly when given to friends or 
family members. Many reported that once they had committed to take part 
they felt compelled to turn up even where their participation conflicted with 
other engagements.  
 
A final area in which a lack of perfect information may affect our political 
decision-making process is the effect of self-perception on our willingness to 
engage. In some cases this may lead to a representation bias. This refers to 
the following line of logic: “I am a fairly typical member of my political 
reference group. If I vote, it is pretty likely that others will vote as well. Being 
like me, they will tend to act like me. Hence I shall indeed vote, to bring it 
58 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: Science and Practice (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 2000). 
59 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, "Citizenship and Civic Engagement: Attitudes and Behaviour in Britain", 
461. 
60 Ibid., 466. 
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about that others vote as well.”61 As Elster points out, “the last step in this 
reasoning is a slide from unexceptional diagnostic thinking to an unjustified 
causal argument.”62  
 
In the absence of concrete knowledge on the actions of others, some 
individuals begin to view their own behaviour as a source of information. This 
may in part explain why many freely choose to engage politically; they believe 
others like them will also choose to engage, thus increasing its effectiveness. 
However, some theorists believe that people’s decisions to participate may 
simply be down to an overestimation of their own influence. As Rothenberg 
puts it, “a subset of the population mistakenly thinks of themselves as highly 
influential. They incorporate into their membership calculi their allegedly 
substantial contribution to the provision of collective goods (which perfectly 
informed contributors in large groups will recognise to be zero). Individuals 
whose perceptions of their efficacy put them at the upper end of the 
population distribution join in disproportionate numbers”. 63 
 
The following section explores the role of social factors – the norms, choices 
and behaviour of those around us. Most theorists argue that social factors 
exert a powerful influence both on political heuristics (Dalton argues that much 
political decision-making relies on social group cues64) and even on our sense 
of political rationality.  
61 Elster, "Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action", 144. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Rothenberg, Linking Citizens to Government: Interest Group Politics at Common Cause, 20. 
64 Dalton, "Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior", 921. 
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Chapter 5: Social drivers 
Main messages 
In this chapter, we examine the social drivers of engagement.  Evidence 
shows that the impact of the attitudes, behaviour and perceptions of others 
exerts a powerful influence on our actions. In particular, we found that group 
identification stimulates engagement.  The focus groups we carried out 
emphasised the role of social networks – formal and informal – in triggering 
engagement. Policymakers, we argue, must engage with these networks if 
they are to boost citizen engagement.  
Human beings are social animals. The existence of social networks and our 
attachment to these reference groups can act as a vital spur to participation, 
and is a factor which tends to be neglected by the rational choice model. As 
Marwell and Oliver put it, a vital omission of rational choice theory is that it 
neglects the “interdependence among actors, where interdependence may be 
defined as…behaviour that takes account of the effect of one’s participation in 
collective action on the participation of others.”65 Potential participants in this 
scenario do possess some information about the actions of others and are 
also aware that the impact of each individual’s contribution to collective goods 
will vary according to the choices of others. Social factors remain the key to 
explaining collective action, in terms of both motivations and outcomes.  
The importance we attach to acceptance and membership of our social group 
means the impact of the attitudes, behaviours and perceptions of others exert 
a powerful influence on our actions. Elster defines social norms as initially 
arising “through the expectations of other people, together with their 
expression of approval and disapproval.”66 In few places is the effect of social 
norms more pronounced than in the field of politics. As Bekkers points out, 
citizens participate in the political arena “not only to advocate their interests in 
politics…but also to find meaning in life, to express their social identity, and to 
contribute to the wellbeing of others.”67  
Similarly, Platt finds that social contact serves not only as an outcome of 
participation, but also as a vital driver; “social and information networks raise 
individuals’ levels of political interest and knowledge, increasing their 
                                                     
65 Gerard Marwell and Pamela Oliver, The Critical Mass in Collective Action: A Micro-Social Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 9. 
66 Elster, "Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action", 153. 
67 Bekkers, "Participation in Voluntary Associations: Relations With Resources, Personality, and Political 
Values", 439. 
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likelihood of engaging in activism”.68 On the other side of this equation there is 
concern that the recent public outcry over apparent electoral and political 
malaise may inadvertently risk reinforcing a social norm that says ‘don’t bother 
to engage politically, no-one else thinks it matters either’. Our social context is 
therefore central to our political values and behaviour and can act both as 
either an incentive for, or a barrier to, political engagement. 
The first issue to note is that discussions on ‘social context’ can encompass a 
wide variety of different settings. On a personal level, it can refer to the people 
immediately around us, such as family, friends and colleagues, with whom we 
identify and have regular contact. As touched on in previous discussions of 
the representation bias, this forms the basis of our reference group. On a 
broader level, our social context can refer to the norms and identifications 
specific to the area in which we live and even national political trends and 
cultures – further discussed in the next section.  
 
When analysing engagement behaviour, the impact of these social contexts 
may be complex to discern. As Kenny sets out, drawing divisions between 
‘individual’ and ‘collective’ forms of participation may be useful, but also 
problematic, since attempting to differentiate these categories “could mask 
effects from the social environment on particular forms of individual activity. 
For example, while the act of voting is certainly performed in isolation, the 
process leading up to this act may well involve interactions with members of 
various social contexts.”69 In this sense, it is clear that social factors – over 
and above rational or internal factors – are instrumental in the area of 
collective action.  
 
Motivations: social learning, duty and non-material incentives 
 
For many advocates of a rational choice approach the desire for social contact 
and group attachment would ultimately render engagement ineffective. The 
coordination of action within large groups would make the temptation to free-
ride virtually impossible to avoid. Yet there is much evidence which would 
appear to negate this claim. Firstly, the existence of large groups is in fact 
generally a powerful driver of further participation. As Jordan and Maloney put 
it, “advertising a large membership reassures the potential member that it is 
sensible to join: can 100,000 others be wrong?”70 This claim attests to the 
significance of social learning – the ways in which we look to those around us 
68 Platt, "Participation for What? A Policy-Motivated Approach to Political Activism", 395. 
69 Christopher B. Kenny, "Political Participation and Effects From the Social Environment," American 
Journal of Political Science, 36: 1 (1992), 259-260. 
70 Jordan and Maloney, "How Bumble-Bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation", 7. 
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for clues on how to behave. If those around us make certain choices, we are 
more likely to believe in the importance and even the rationality of those 
actions.  
 
The suggestive effect of other contributors is particularly marked if the people 
involved are those with whom we feel a particular connection or whose 
opinions we value. A review of the effects of group identification on political 
protest amongst farmers in the Netherlands, found – perhaps unsurprisingly – 
that group identification stimulates protest participation and that the strength 
of this identification was closely related to the physical and cultural proximity 
of the group (regional ties were stronger, while national or European ties were 
weaker).71 It also concluded that successful group mobilisation was based on 
social, rather than merely professional, bonds and that collective action 
tended to be motivated by the strength of this in-group identification, rather 
than out-group differentiation.72 This suggests that the quality of the social ties 
within a group, not simply the existence of some form of connection or a 
perceived threat, is also significant in predicting levels of collective action.  
 
Yet, as well as personal, non-material benefits to political participation, many 
participants also cite a less tangible motivation: a sense of duty. As Elster puts 
it: “the relevance of duty to collective action is captured in the phrase, but 
what if everyone did that? What if everyone left their beer bottles on the 
beach, stayed home on voting day, or fiddled with their tax returns? Duty 
enjoins us to do what we can rationally will that everyone should do.”73  
 
The notion tends to be grounded in a sense of historical awareness, cultural 
loyalty or a desire to ‘give something back’ to a community, particularly one 
from which an individual has already drawn benefits. When questioned on 
their motivation for voting in the 2005 general election, one respondent 
answered, “people died for me to be able to vote. I had this nagging voice in 
my head.”74 This sense of social reciprocity, to present and even historical 
communities, dictates a great deal of human behaviour. At its most basic 
level, this is encapsulated in the notion of gifts, and their role in the political 
economy.  
 
 
71 Marga de Weerd and Bert Klandermans, "Group Identification and Political Protest: Farmers' Protest 
in the Netherlands," European Journal of Social Psychology, 29 (2009), 1091. 
72 de Weerd and Klandermans, "Group Identification and Political Protest: Farmers' Protest in the 
Netherlands", 1091. 
73 Elster, "Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action", 142. 
74 Electoral Commission, Election 2005 Turnout: How Many, Who and Why? (London: Electoral 
Commission, 2005), 28. 
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Social factors: Findings from the focus groups 
 
If policy is to successfully build on motivations for participation, the initial 
trigger for political engagement is the most important area to understand. 
Obviously, such triggers vary widely according to personal circumstance, but 
there are certain common elements revealed in participants’ responses.  This 
aspect of engagement behaviour was explored in some detail with focus 
groups involving young and black and minority ethnic participants. 
Discussions revealed that the initial spurs to engage were almost always 
linked to people’s involvement in particular social networks. In some cases, 
the decision to engage was taken in response to a particular event affecting 
an individual’s local or cultural community, in others it was due to a personal 
request.  
 
Throughout the discussions on motivations, this primary role of social 
networks was consistently highlighted. The power of suggestion, both explicit 
and implicitly through the behaviour of those around us, cannot be 
understated in this respect. The term ‘social network’ is obviously a broad 
one, and for these participants encompassed ties to friends and families, the 
local community, traditional institutions such as the church and more 
contemporary ideas of community such as the workplace. Involvement in 
particular social networks varies between different sectors of society. One 
notable difference between the two groups was the fact that, while the black 
and minority ethnic group, and older participants in particular, were often 
heavily involved in traditional, usually religious, channels of participation, the 
young people’s group were much more likely to engage via their workplace, 
course of study or even through online social networking.  
 
Traditional institutions and the local community 
Ties to institutions traditionally deemed to facilitate participation, and local or 
cultural communities, were particularly pronounced among the black and 
minority ethnic group members. While party political affiliations were virtually 
non-existent, the church was an important catalyst of participation, particularly 
for older, female group members. Communal involvement and contribution 
appears to become a norm in certain religious communities, with members 
reporting they helped with the day-to-day running of the church, such as 
Sunday School, as well as offering other services to other members, such as 
counselling. One participant in the black and minority ethnic group recalled 
that they had become involved, “through my family being involved and going 
to church – and then I began to feel like I am not contributing anything really.” 
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For the black and minority ethnic group the concrete institution of the church 
formed, in many cases, the basis of ties to a wider local or a cultural 
community. A sense of belonging within these communities was another 
important means of motivating collective action. Some discussed the 
stereotypes they felt they faced as black women, for example, and the desire 
to challenge and overcome these prejudices through collective action. Others 
felt they had been beneficiaries of community initiatives themselves and were 
driven by a desire to reciprocate. One participant reported he had turned from 
a “user to a provider”:  
 
“Culturally, from my background, it’s something everybody wants to do. 
Everybody’s living in poverty per se and everyone has this dream of 
being a Robin Hood figure. You know, going away, making it and giving 
back. You hear all the rappers talking about it. So it was instilled in me 
that if I grew up and became successful, you know, I wanted to return 
to my hood on my nice shiny horse and give something back.” 
Group member: Black and minority ethnic   
 
Yet, for young people in particular, such traditional communal institutions are 
less relevant. A marked contrast in discussions with younger participants was 
the way in which non-traditional ‘communities’, such as the workplace, had 
provided a forum through which to engage. For example, one participant who 
worked as a personal trainer described how he had been approached through 
contacts at work:  
 
“I got asked by the football coaches I work with if I had done coaching 
before and I said I had and they asked if I would do it on a voluntary 
basis”  
Group member: Young people 
 
However in these cases where activities were tied to a particular issue or 
profession, they were generally limited to this area and did not lead to other 
forms of participation. 
 
Peer pressure and persuasion 
In less formally organised social networks, the role of suggestion or 
persuasion from immediate peer groups was another important driver of 
participation. Participants cited upbringing, contacts in the workplace and the 
encouragement of friends and family as a crucial element of the trigger which 
prompted them to begin participating: 
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“My parents were really community-minded – so I have always seen 
these things while growing up, and got that message about giving back 
to the community” 
Group 2: Black and minority ethnic  
 
“[On motivations] Mine was my sister nagging me to come and help out 
at her daughter’s school” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
“Loads of people kept coming up to me at work and telling me I’d be 
really good at it – I suppose because I am so young and normally 
school governors are so old and set in their ways… so I just thought I’ll 
go and do it.” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
These kinds of drivers, over more traditional, institutionalised forms, appeared 
to be particularly relevant for young people’s participation. Often, incentives 
came from within the workplace and many of the activities they undertook 
were directly related to their careers or course of study. A sense of efficacy – 
of their awareness that they possessed certain skills and that they had the 
ability to offer these to others – was a common strand in the discussions. Most 
were also keen to see the tangible results of their participation and strongly 
believed their contribution was making a difference.  
 
In some cases participation was not down to a direct request, but a chance 
event or problem which provoked a desire to respond. In these cases too the 
initial recourse was to others in the community in a similar situation.  
 
“You’re desperate for services and you’re just not getting it, so you talk 
to other people and find out they’re in the same situation. So you start 
to figure out what to do, who to contact” 
Group 2: Black and minority ethnic           
 
Benefits of participation 
 
Yet, despite the obvious significance of social networks to the initial 
motivations to engage, there was little sense that participants viewed their 
engagement activities as primarily a social undertaking – the ‘solidary’ 
incentives for engagement discussed by Jordan and Maloney. None of the 
younger group members reported that their involvement in engagement 
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activities had reinforced or extended their friendship groups; the motivations 
they mentioned were more closely linked to self-efficacy and recognition than 
to the fun of taking part or the social contact involved. In short, they were far 
more concerned with purposive, rather than solidary, incentives. Unlike those 
who took part via more traditional social institutions, the younger group 
members, were not generally part of friendship groups who also participated.  
 
“I have a few friends that aren’t really interested in it at all – but then it 
is not for everyone is it” 
Group 1:Young people 
 
“Most people think it is hilarious that I have governors meetings to go to 
– but I think, well, you should be going as well” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
“I haven’t really met anyone else [in terms of making friends] – though I 
have met a lot of people in the wider community” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
So evidence from the focus groups pointed to the importance of social 
networks as the initial trigger for participation. Yet solidary incentives were 
less significant once participants began engaging, and the benefits most often 
cited were related to less tangible personal gains such as status or a sense of 
efficacy. In this sense, it is not necessary to discount the rational choice 
model, but to use the findings of behavioural economics to expand its 
framework. Following, we put forward some proposals on what this revised 
model might encompass.  
 
Conclusion: towards a more complete view of human motivation 
 
It is clearly impossible to draw concrete conclusions on the motivations for 
collective action.  As Elster puts it, “the importance of mixed motivations in 
collective action should be clear. It is not only that different forms of collective 
action are held up by different motivations. A given case of collective action 
will also in most cases have participants who are motivated by quite different 
concerns.”75  
 
The paradox invoked by the rational choice model has presented problems, 
given its pre-eminence within many policymaking spheres. As Petracca 
argues, “rational choice omits far too much from the complex scheme of 
75 Elster, "Rationality, Morality, and Collective Action", 154. 
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political life to be entirely reliable and useful as either explanatory or predictive 
theory.”76 But this does not mean we can discount its conclusions. Indeed, 
evidence from the focus groups suggests that individuals do take the costs 
and benefits of communal activities into account when taking decisions on 
participation. Rather than an attempt to replace the rational choice model with 
another, Jordan and Maloney sum up by stating “the history of the literature 
[on engagement] is of a battle to reinsert non-material incentives into the 
calculation.”77  
76 Mark P. Petracca, "The Rational Choice Approach to Politics: A Challenge to Democratic Theory," 
The Review of Politics, 53: 2 (1991), 289. 
77 Jordan and Maloney, "How Bumble-Bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation", 11. 
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Chapter 6: Summary of policy implications  
Main messages 
This chapter summarises some of the policy conclusions that flow from our 
analysis and brings together points made earlier in the report. It suggests 
policies and approaches that policymakers can use, drawing on the external, 
economic and social drivers of behaviour identified in this report.  
The focus groups highlighted a number of common themes in the decision-
making processes and behaviour of those currently engaging politically. As we 
saw in Chapter 3, regarding external factors, focus group members argued 
that it was time not money that constituted the main ‘cost’ to getting involved. 
If policymakers focused on the financial incentives to involvement (vouchers 
for voting, for example) they would miss the point of engagement for many 
citizens. Policies to encourage involvement should be based around 
compensating for the time, not financial costs, involved. This could be 
achieved by working with employers to allow more volunteering 
opportunities in work time. This would also allow citizens to develop skills, 
both inside the workplace and in the wider community, such as team-building, 
leadership and a variety of soft skills.  
 
It was also found that the initial decision to engage often involved recognition 
of the personal benefits and was not purely altruistic. For many participants 
engagement relied on the provision of what could be called ‘CV-building’ 
opportunities. Generally, those who took part in single-issue, non-traditional 
activities framed their messages in terms of the potential for personal gain (by 
contrast, those involved in institutionally-coordinated activities tended to focus 
more on the benefits to the local community and wider society). One focus 
group member in the younger group, for example, commented that 
engagement was a way to set yourself apart from your peers and gain skills 
and experience that they did not have:  
 
“I would persuade younger kids so they could see the benefits from a 
young age. It would set them apart from the majority of their peers and 
stand for difference.” 
Group 1: Young people 
 
As such, we argued that policymakers should focus on what individuals 
can gain from greater engagement as well as the wider social benefits. 
Evidence from our focus group suggested that once there was an initial 
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decision to engage, this often ‘snowballed’ into other areas and greater 
commitment.  
 
As we discussed in Chapter 4, internal factors for policymakers (and for 
volunteer groups looking to boost the numbers of people involved) include the 
well-known approach to get a publically stated commitment or agreement 
on when, where and for whom engagement will occur. (It is, for example, 
an approach used by those who run the National Blood Service, which signs 
donors up well in advance for specific appointments.)  
 
We saw in Chapter 1 that that the proportion of people who say that are 
interested in engaging is much higher than the proportion that do. If this is 
true, there is a latent desire to get involved amongst a large section of the 
population. This takes an initial push from someone else. The obvious 
consequence of this is that policymakers should work with community 
groups, and other organisations that provide engagement opportunities, 
to fund active community ‘recruitment strategies’, rather than simply 
providing information and awaiting volunteers to act on it.  
 
Again, once engaged the literature shows that in many cases this behaviour 
becomes habitual and is likely to continue. Citizens also respond to ‘people 
like them’. This could be a particularly powerful way on getting young people 
in particular more involved. There is a large amount of work on ‘imitation’ and 
the greater use of role models to encourage involvement should be 
explored further – footballers have far greater influence than politicians for 
many sections on the population. Government and the Football Association 
are aware of this, but there is room for development around political 
engagement. Similar arguments can be made for singers and film stars, and 
in general ‘social marketing’ is underused. The powerful role of imitation was 
reflected in the comments of one black and minority ethnic focus group 
member, who argued: 
 
“Young black men need role models. With your input they would [be 
more likely] to become fully active members of society.”  
Group 2: Black and minority ethnic  
 
More difficult for government in a recession is the role that loss aversion has 
on boosting engagement. Evidence from the literature and focus groups 
showed the powerful effect that the threat of closure to existing services has 
on citizens. This is particularly problematic for policymakers as they come to 
decommission services (sometimes for more efficient versions). Recent 
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moves in public policy to engage citizens in decommissioning processes 
(such as citizens’ juries and collective commissioning) offer one way around 
this challenge, and provide a constructive opportunity for engagement.  
 
As Chapter 5 showed, evidence from the focus groups and literature showed 
that the triggers of participation were centred on social networks – both 
institutionalised and informal. Even where the decision to participate was in 
response to a chance event, action was generally coordinated through a pre-
existing social group.  
 
Interestingly, these social networks were not often political ones; although the 
participants were all people who considered themselves to be politically active 
in the community, only one person across both groups was a member of a 
political party. Policymakers must respond to the different ways in which 
different groups get involved. There is no one size fits all approach. There was 
a clear division between the patterns of activity between the two focus groups 
(which reflects Inglehart’s theories set out in Chapter 1); young people were 
far more likely to have become involved in non-traditional activities – often 
through the workplace or their course of study – and to remain focused on a 
specific issue.  
 
In contrast, the spectrum of activities amongst the black and minority ethnic 
group was much broader; six members were involved in local consultation 
groups or had attended public meetings; four were involved in local charities 
or pressure groups; three had contacted elected officials and two had taken 
part in public demonstrations. They were also far more likely to participate via 
institutions, most notably the church. As such, policymakers must respond 
to social networks as they are, not as they were. This means providing 
information and links on social networking sites in order to engage, as 
well as providing information via traditional institutions, such as unions, 
schools and religious organisations. 
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